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ABSTRACT: The COVID-19 pandemic has refocused attention worldwide on the dangers of
infectious diseases, in terms of both global health and the effects on the world economy. Even
in high income countries, health systems have been found wanting in dealing with the new
infectious agent. However, the even greater long-term danger of antimicrobial resistance in
pathogenic bacteria and fungi is still under-appreciated, especially among the general public.
Although antimicrobial drug development faces significant scientific challenges, the gravest
challenge at the moment appears to be economic, where the lack of a viable market has led to a
collapse in drug development pipelines. There is therefore a critical need for governments
across the world to further incentivize the development of antimicrobials. Most incentive
strategies over the past decade have focused on so-called “push” incentives that bridge the
costs of antimicrobial research and development, but these have been insufficient for reviving
the pipeline. In this Perspective, we analyze the current incentive strategies in place for
antimicrobial drug development, and focus on “pull” incentives, which instead aim to improve
revenue generation and thereby resolve the antimicrobial market failure challenge. We further
analyze these incentives in a broader “One Health” context and stress the importance of developing and enforcing strict protocols to
ensure appropriate manufacturing practices and responsible use. Our analysis reiterates the importance of international cooperation,
coordination across antimicrobial research, and sustained funding in tackling this significant global challenge. A failure to invest
wisely and continuously to incentivize antimicrobial pipelines will have catastrophic consequences for global health and wellbeing in
the years to come.
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■ INTRODUCTION
As we survey the damage caused by COVID-19, it is
increasingly clear that societies and governments across the
globe underestimated the ever present threats posed by
infectious diseases.1 The widespread loss of lives and
livelihoods that continues through the COVID-19 pandemic
highlights the susceptibility of our deeply interconnected
global networks to novel infectious agents and reminds us that
infectious diseases respect no border, causing millions of
deaths across both low-income2 and high-income countries
(HICs) every year.
However, while the world focuses on a viral pandemic for
the present, we must not forget the potentially even more
disruptive burden of antimicrobial resistant (AMR) bacterial
and fungal pathogens, which threaten the very edifice of
modern medicine. Without changes in policy, it is estimated
that antimicrobial resistant infections may result in 10 million
annual deaths by 2050.3 Further, the World Bank estimates
that the global economy may lose up to 3.8% of its annual
gross domestic product (GDP) by 2050, with an annual
shortfall of up to $3.4 trillion by 2030.4 Worryingly, the World
Bank report itself suggests that this may be an underestimate,
since the impact of AMR pathogens was modeled on the basis
of shocks to labor supply and livestock productivity, which may
not fully account for all the economic effects of AMR.4
Economic losses on such a scale will inevitably threaten public
health and livelihoods across the globe.5,6
Modern medical systems have been developed assuming a
continuous supply of functional antimicrobials to combat
infectious disease and deliver effective health care. For
example, without effective antibiotics, a wide range of common
surgical procedures may be deemed too dangerous to perform
due to the risk of potentially untreatable surgical site infections
(SSIs),7−10 thereby massively decreasing quality of life for
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patients. Childbirth and caesarean sections will become fraught
with danger for both mother and child;11,12 indeed, in 2016, a
World Health Organization (WHO) commentary reported
that approximately 200 000 newborns die annually due to
infections that do not respond to existing drugs, highlighting
the increasingly widespread burden of drug resistance.13 The
scourge of tuberculosis has returned in multidrug resistant
form, presenting an enormous global health challenge.14
Multidrug resistance has been detected in a wide range of
common pathogenic bacterial species including Klebsiella
pneumonia,15 Salmonella enterica serotype typhi,16 Enterococci
spp.,17 and many others. The plague, cause of the worst
pandemics known to history, has seen a resurgence in cases
over the past couple of decades.18,19 In 1997, a multidrug
resistant clinical isolate of Yersinia pestis (the causative agent of
plague) was reported,20 and surveillance of antibiotic resistance
in Y. pestis worldwide is now a necessity.21
Bacterial infections even exacerbate the health impacts of
respiratory viral diseases such as influenza. Indeed, the majority
of deaths in the 1918−1919 H1N1 influenza pandemic are
believed to have resulted directly from secondary pneumonia
caused by bacterial species commonly found in the upper
respiratory tract; similar trends were observed in the viral
pandemics of 1957 and 1968.22 The 2009 swine influenza
pandemic saw secondary bacterial pneumonia identified in
29−55% of mortalities.23 Without effective antibiotics, deaths
from secondary bacterial infections will inevitably increase with
the burden of viral diseases. In the case of COVID-19, an early
study reported that although only 6.9% of COVID-19 patients
were showing bacterial co-infections, antibiotics (in most cases
broad spectrum agents) were being given in over 70% of
cases.24 Such overuse may exacerbate the problem of AMR,
particularly in hospital settings.25
In this Perspective, we focus on the risks associated with
growing bacterial resistance to antibiotics and the economic
challenges underlying the failure of the development pipeline
to tackle drug-resistant infections (Box 1). We examine
different incentive schemes to reinvigorate antibiotic research
and development (R&D) in the pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industries. We compare and contrast various
“push” incentives, which involve directly lowering the cost of
R&D, with “pull” incentives that instead aim to improve
revenue. We suggest that a range of pull incentives that address
the antibiotic market failure crisis are needed to complement
the push incentives currently supporting drug development. A
combination of appropriate push and pull incentives, financed
and supported at least initially by governments and tailored to
the specific needs of individual developers, is required to
circumvent this crisis. We discuss how any publicly funded
schemes must incorporate broader “One Health” consider-
ations regarding appropriate antimicrobial use and manufactur-
ing practices to be truly effective in the long term. We also
argue for simultaneous incentives for rapid diagnostic testing,
and importantly its integration into clinical practice, to support
the next generation of antimicrobial therapies and effective
clinical decision-making. Finally, we support recent calls for the
establishment of a supranational treaty to coordinate AMR
efforts at a global level and suggest mechanisms to devolve
specific responsibilities across HICs and LMICs (low- and
middle-income countries) within such a treaty (Box 2).
■ ECONOMIC DISINCENTIVES FOR ANTIMICROBIAL
DISCOVERY
Despite the importance of antibiotics in the medical system,
and the additional threat of the re-emergence of untreatable
pandemic bacterial diseases, investment in developing new
antibiotics remains neglected.26 While serious scientific
challenges exist in antibiotic R&D,27,28 one of the gravest
challenges lies in the economics of antibiotic develop-
ment.3,29−31 The commercial success of a drug has, in the
past, typically been dependent on a combination of its sales
and price. The antibiotics market suffers from a unique set of
problems in these two respects. First, higher sales volumes are
more likely to drive the rapid emergence of resistance.32
Doctors are therefore encouraged not to prescribe new
antibiotics unless absolutely necessary and to generally reduce
antibiotic prescribing to slow the spread of resistance. This has
led to a marked decrease in antibiotics sales over the past few
years in countries such as the UK, which has a strong focus on
antibiotic stewardship.33 Second, the prices of antibiotics in the
market are also influenced by the abundance of low-price
generics;34 for example, a 2015 study reported that the widely
used antibiotic vancomycin was available in the UK for under
£35 a day.35 However, the prices of new antibiotics are then
often benchmarked against these low-cost drugs. For example,
in the USA, by far the world’s largest pharmaceutical market,
the diagnosis-related group (DRG) reimbursement system
assumed that generic antimicrobials will be used to treat
infections. Hospitals that required branded antimicrobials to
treat resistant infections would lose thousands of dollars on
each patient requiring such treatment, thus disincentivizing the
addition of new antibiotics to their formularies and further
Box 1. Major Policy Challenges
• Without changes in policy, antimicrobial resistant
infections are predicted to cause 10 million annual
deaths by 2050.3
• However, it is not only resistant infections that cause
significant mortality. The lack of access to antimicro-
bials itself causes around 5.7 million deaths annually
from infections that are currently treatable.92
• Market failure hinders the commercial development of
new antimicrobials, despite recently increased “push”
funding to cover R&D costs.
• In the absence of other incentives, new antibiotics must
be priced significantly higher than older generic
antibiotics to make their development commercially
viable.
• Incentives are required to refresh the antibiotic pipeline,
particularly to address clinically unmet needs. Any
incentives must also be contingent on meeting access
requirements, particularly in LMIC settings.
• Incentives are also required to support the clinical
translation of rapid diagnostics to facilitate appropriate
stewardship of antibiotic prescribing in clinical settings.
• Poor antibiotic manufacturing practices and agricultural
misuse also contribute to the spread of resistance,
requiring AMR specific policy making across a range of
policy areas.
• The multifaceted problems of AMR require global
cooperation across multiple policy areas, in a variety of
different socioeconomic settings.
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exacerbating the market failure crisis.36 Important reforms in
the reimbursement mechanisms targeting these artificial price
caps on novel antibiotics were introduced by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) in 2019 to encourage
innovation in the field.37 However, it remains to be seen
whether this is enough or whether further reforms are required.
Similar reimbursement related economics plague antibiotic
pricing in Europe as well, but in a promising development,
Germany has recently announced reforms to facilitate higher
reimbursements for “reserve” antibiotics that are meant to be
used only when treating multidrug resistant infections.38
These price-related difficulties for antimicrobials are in stark
contrast to the pricing of new treatments for other disease
indications like Hepatitis C, which cost closer to £30,000 per
patient in the UK,35 or the latest generation CAR-T-cell
(chimeric antigen receptor T-cell) cancer therapies that can
reportedly cost hundreds of thousands of pounds. The high
prices of these drugs are justified by the developers, and
generally accepted (after some negotiation) by payers, based
on their vast superiority over older treatments, despite access
related concerns.39 However, in the case of antibiotics, a new
drug is only vastly superior when used to treat an infection that
is resistant to all available low-price generics. At present, pan-
drug resistant infections are still relatively rare (although
increasing in number40), making it difficult to justify pricing
new antibiotics in a manner similar to new Hepatitis C or
CAR-T-cell therapies. To sustain innovation in antibiotic
development, financial modeling suggested that the price of a
new antibiotic, assuming a treatment time of 2 weeks, would
need to be approximately $1,000 per day in the absence of
other incentives to make the returns viable for the developer;41
we are indeed seeing prices in this range for new products such
as ceftazidime−avibactam for certain indications.42 However,
even these prices may not be enough to reinvigorate the
pipeline. For example, Avycaz (the brand name of
ceftazidime−avibactam), approved in 2015 by the FDA for
complicated intra-abdominal and urinary tract infections, had
sales of $43 million in the first 9 months of 2017,43 which is
likely still too low to interest private investors, given the risks
and costs associated with development. Counterfeit, sub-
standard, and falsified antibiotics, encountered since the
introduction of penicillin, further exacerbate these prob-
lems.44,45
The upshot of this is that although the societal benefit of
new antibiotics is very high (the monetary benefits to society
of a new antibacterial are estimated to range between $486
million and $12 billion depending on the indication46), the
modeled “private” value (i.e., the value for the drug developer)
ranges from negative (−$4.5 million) to positive $37.4
million.35 In contrast, the so-called net present value (NPV)
of a new arthritis drug is estimated to be positive $1 billion at
discovery.29 This commercial reality has led to a complete
failure of the antibiotic market, and most big pharmaceutical
companies have abandoned the field and diverted resources
into more profitable products. This has left the bulk of the
antibiotic R&D mantle in the hands of small biotechnology
companies.47−49 However, as the recent bankruptcies of
Achaogen and Melinta demonstrate, even when companies
successfully manage to develop antibiotics and bring them to
market, the cost of discovery and development, combined with
the lack of a profitable market, leads to their collapse. This in
turn dampens investor confidence, discouraging further
investment.
This is already beginning to have severe consequences. The
O’Neill report commissioned by the UK government estimated
in 2016 that 700 000 people a year die due to antimicrobial
resistant infections. As mentioned previously, projections
suggest that, without intervention, the annual death toll
would reach 10 million by 2050.3 The burden of drug resistant
infections is disproportionately greater for LMICs at present,50
but as we have seen with the COVID-19 pandemic, emerging
infectious diseases are a global threat. It is a question of when
and not if these pathogens spread across the globe, as has been
seen previously, for example, with the rapid spread of
pathogens hosting the NDM-1 multidrug resistance gene
across the world from its origin in India.51 New antimicrobials
will inevitably be required across the globe, not just in LMICs.
It is therefore critical, even as the world counts the costs of
the COVID-19 pandemic, to urgently resolve the market
failure problem of these crucial drugs.
■ PULL INCENTIVES ARE NEEDED TO
COMPLEMENT EXISTING PUSH FUNDING
MECHANISMS TO ACCELERATE THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ANTIMICROBIALS
Over the past decade, several incentives have been proposed to
encourage the pharmaceutical industry to re-engage in
antimicrobial R&D. These can be broadly categorized into
two groups: push incentives and pull incentives (Table 1).
Push incentives are defined as strategies associated with
directly lowering the costs of developing a new antimicrobial
drug candidate. This outcome can be achieved by distributing
the expenditure among multiple stakeholders, which reduces
the economic risk associated with the failure of a potential drug
candidate. As such, push incentives can be seen as early
funding that can assist pharmaceutical companies in progress-
ing through the different R&D stages (Figure 1) or as an
incentive that partly offsets the costs of a potential project
failing; this includes scientific research grants or direct funding.
Pull incentives, on the other hand, reward those who
successfully develop a novel antimicrobial by increasing or
ensuring future revenues. More specifically, pull incentives can
be further subcategorized into either outcome-based or lego-
regulatory. Outcome-based pull incentives are associated with
advanced milestone reward payments, which can be given at
each successful R&D stage, as well as at the market utilization
stage (Figure 1). Lego-regulatory pull incentives are associated
with policies that indirectly enable greater returns for the
developer in the future, such as market exclusivity extensions.
Due to the inherent challenges in drug development and
high failure rates, push incentives cover both unsuccessful
projects and successful therapeutics. However, although crucial
for early stage development, these incentives do not reward
successful drug development at the late R&D stage of market
entry, as these incentives do not guarantee profits. For
example, Achaogen received funding to enable the develop-
ment of its new aminoglycoside plazomicin up to commerci-
alization, but the company still collapsed postapproval due to
insufficient sales that could not offset the costs incurred. This
highlights the fact that push incentives alone are unlikely to
sustain antimicrobial pipelines; the added use of pull incentives
is required to prevent further such bankruptcies. The UK has
taken a lead on this approach and will be trialing a subscription
system with two contracts to pay pharmaceutical companies up
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front depending on the usefulness of the therapeutic, rather
than relying on sale profits to drive investment.58−60
Market entry rewards (MERs) are examples of outcome-
based pull incentives, with monetary rewards provided when
the antimicrobial enters the market. These may be fully
delinked, where the reward is not proportional to the units
sold, or partially delinked, where part of the revenues still come
from sales of the product. In terms of cost, the partially
delinked model is considered by some to be more
sustainable,54 as in this model a portion of the money is
generated through sales. Besides the lower costs, the partially
delinked models may also be used in conjunction with existing
reimbursement mechanisms.54 However, on the flip side, as
there is still some dependence on sales, this again creates an
incentive to maximize sale volumes, thus impacting steward-
ship. Such partially delinked rewards will need careful fine-
tuning in terms of balancing the reward payments and
expected market returns to ensure that the new drugs funded
by these mechanisms are not overused, while ensuring that the
risk in investment borne by private entities is also appropriately
balanced against potential rewards.
The delinkage model has the added benefit of having a lower
likelihood of secondary disruptive effects compared with other
pull incentives.61 This is because, unlike some other incentive
models, such as market exclusivity extensions, they do not
impact patient drug access either through increased pricing or
delayed generics. However, this comes at the cost of relying on
sustained funding. For both the fully delinked and partially
delinked MER models, it is necessary to consider how these
rewards would be funded. The O’Neil report provides an
example of using a “pay or play” tax that could provide funding,
with companies that choose not to invest in antimicrobial
research paying an additional tax. However, the implications
on the cost of medicines because of this tax may then have
knock-on effects for access to other drugs produced by these
companies.
On the other hand, tradeable exclusivity vouchers are an
example of a lego-regulatory pull incentive, which enable
companies producing antimicrobials to extend the exclusivity
period of another more profitable drug.54 Indeed, various types
of vouchers have been proposed including priority review
vouchers, where another more profitable drug may be awarded
a priority review status and fast-tracked in the review process,
enabling quicker market entry. However, there are several
limitations to such a scheme62 that might impede patient
access to treatments for other conditions. For example, if there
is a delay in access to generics for other conditions such as
cancer, due to an extension of the exclusivity period for a
cancer drug, this might limit patients being able to access these
treatments. Carefully thought out solutions, such as ensuring
that the value of a voucher is tightly coupled to the value of the
antimicrobial developed, will be crucial to the success of such a
pull mechanism.62
Strikingly, over 95% of antimicrobial drugs in development
today are from small companies, and approximately 75% of
these companies are “pre-revenue” with no products on the
market.63 To build a sustainable pipeline of antimicrobials in
the future, we need to both support the SMEs currently driving
antimicrobial R&D and also attract “Big Pharma” back into this
space. Big Pharma has the advantage of access to expertise
across a wide variety of fields, such as medicinal chemistry,
pharmacology, and (in the case of antimicrobial R&D)






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ACS Infectious Diseases pubs.acs.org/journal/aidcbc Perspective
https://dx.doi.org/10.1021/acsinfecdis.0c00681
ACS Infect. Dis. XXXX, XXX, XXX−XXX
E
programs, especially when the classes of drugs being
discovered are novel. Further, the discovery of novel
antimicrobial classes will require fundamental exploratory
research, potentially easier in a Big Pharma setting than in
an SME where the pressures of external financiers and tight
timelines may disincentivize much exploratory work. They also
have significant lego-regulatory and sales infrastructure in place
enabling the smooth transition from discovery and develop-
ment to revenue generation. By comparison Achaogen had to
restructure 28% of its workforce away from primary R&D to
support the sale of plazomicin. That said, Big Pharma also
suffers from timeline/milestone disincentives that may derail
early stage exploratory projects. Closer interactions between
pharmaceutical companies and academia in the field may be a
potential solution to this problem, although more flexible and
timely mechanisms of funding would be required to enable
this, potentially through a national consortia with expert
antimicrobial discovery oversight, enabling the rapid pro-
gression of promising projects. Since SMEs often involve spin-
outs from academic research groups, a close working
collaboration spanning academia, SMEs, and Big Pharma
may facilitate the discovery of novel classes of antimicrobials,
which are desperately needed. Government funded nonprofit
organizations such as the Medicines Discovery Catapult in the
UK ought to be well placed, with appropriate targets and
support, to facilitate these interactions, given their unique role
in the drug discovery ecosystem.
Given the different scales and financial capabilities of the
partners needed to reboot antimicrobial discovery, incentive
strategies will need to be flexible, to address the specific needs
of individual companies (we have compared the advantages
and disadvantages of various incentives from the perspective of
SMEs vs large pharmaceutical companies in Table 1). This
could include using a hybridization of multiple pull incentives
or a combination of push and pull incentives. An example of a
proposed hybrid strategy is the Options Market for Antibiotics
(OMA), which allows investment in the development of a drug
in return for receiving a specified number of units of the drug
at a reduced price, if and when the antibiotic successfully
reaches the market.64 In addition to receiving the drug at a
reduced price on market entry, the option purchaser also drives
the development of the drug that they desire; this may be of
interest to funders or investors who wish to target specific
pathogens that are a burden in LMICs, for example, where the
market conditions for a new drug are especially challenging.64
Another example proposed as part of the Antibiotic
Conservation Effectiveness strategy hybridizes outcomes-
based and lego-regulatory pull incentives by using a
combination of conservation-based market exclusivity, antitrust
waivers, and value-based reimbursement.65 It is worth
mentioning that such hybrid strategies may be of interest for
incentivizing the development of drugs for neglected tropical
diseases, which also suffer from a lack of investment from drug
developers due to market considerations.66
■ INCENTIVIZING “NON-ANTIBIOTIC”
THERAPEUTICS
Given the difficulties facing the development of traditional
antibiotics over the past few decades, attention is now also
turning to alternative “non-antibiotic” therapeutics as a means
of addressing the AMR challenge.67 A recent WHO review
reported that over one-third of antibacterials in preclinical
development were nontraditional products. It is therefore
worth considering how incentive strategies might need to be
adapted to support these novel therapeutics.68 Funding to
specifically incentivize nontraditional approaches has been
provided by CARB-X in the recent past,69 but additional
incentives will be needed to sustain development through to
market, via the pull incentives in the previous section.
Nontraditional antimicrobial therapies have previously been
categorized into four groups: standalone (e.g., phages, lysins,
vaccines), transformations (e.g., Gram-negative activity
achieved by combining polymyxin B analogues with approved
Gram-positive antibiotics), augmentation (e.g., virulence factor
inhibitor + approved antibiotic), and restoration (β-lactam +
β-lactamase inhibitor combination).67 Given these often work
alongside traditional antibiotics, regulatory approval may be
challenging when the benefit is incremental and their benefit
might only increase once resistance to the traditional antibiotic
occurs.70 Clear regulatory guidance will therefore need to be
given to companies developing these products, to ensure that
this is not a barrier to their development and that there is
clarity on the requirements in clinical trials to meet regulatory
approval. Besides combinations of novel nontraditional
therapeutics with older antibiotics, developers may also wish
to consider using novel antibiotics (and especially novel
classes, if and when developed) in combinations to prevent the
rapid emergence of resistance that occurs, particularly when
using single-target drugs. Such combination regimens are used,
for example, in treating tuberculosis and HIV patients.71
However, developing therapeutic drug combinations is a
pharmacological challenge. This will require a high-level of
coordination and cooperation between developers of novel
antibiotic classes, and a cost-effective regulatory pathway that
facilitates the development of combination therapies for
multiple novel classes of drugs.
As a corollary, our most effective antibiotics multitarget,
inhibiting two or more enzymes (e.g., β-lactams and
fluoroquinolones) or binding to components of 30S and 50S
subunits that are multiply encoded (e.g., macrolides, amino-
glycosides, tetracyclines) or inhibiting substrates encoded by
biochemical pathways (e.g., glycopeptides). These antibiotics
Figure 1. Summary of the different R&D stages and pharmaceutical industry costs involved in the development of a new therapeutic. Estimates of
costs are taken from Paul et al. (2010)55 (marked *, modeled capitalized costs per launch of a new molecular entity) and Rex 202056 (marked †,
specifically for antibiotics for the first five years postapproval). Recent estimates put the capitalized cost of bringing a new antibiotic to market at
around $1.3 billion.56,57 However, a figure that is often overlooked is the cost postapproval, which for antibiotics is estimated to be $250−500
million over the first five years that the drug is on the market.56
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are generally resilient to resistance emerging by point
mutation. This general principle must not be lost in the rush
for novel approaches.
Companies developing nontraditional antimicrobials are also
likely to be academic spin-outs and biotechnology companies
who do not usually have industry-level expertise in drug
development. Therefore, investment in the sharing and
development of these skills from larger companies will be
essential in driving the development of these alternative
therapies.72
Despite an emerging and encouraging pipeline, there are
relatively few “non-antibiotic” therapies currently on the
market, which makes it challenging to identify the most
appropriate incentive mechanisms for these products. It will be
important to monitor the development and success of these
therapeutics and consider their position in the overarching goal
of combatting AMR, so as not to miss out on crucial
opportunities. This is also an area that requires more
fundamental research to overcome scientific barriers and may
benefit from grant based push incentives for translational
projects still anchored in academia. On a positive note, it is
possible that private finance may look more kindly on
investments in innovative antimicrobial approaches as
compared to traditional small molecule antibiotics, especially
when put in the context of the drive toward personalized
medicine.73 Public−private partnerships may be a particularly
interesting modality for developing these nontraditional
products, which should be modeled further as the current
preclinical pipeline matures. However, the issues around
pricing and revenue remain similar for nontraditional and
traditional therapies: if the patient group to be treated (i.e., sale
volume) is small, challenges around revenue generation will
remain for nontraditional products as well.
■ THE CLINICAL TRANSLATION OF RAPID
DIAGNOSTICS MUST ALSO BE INCENTIVIZED TO
SUPPORT ANTIMICROBIAL DEVELOPMENT
When debating the use of different incentives for stimulating
antimicrobial development, one must also take into account
wider problems in antimicrobial R&D and use. For instance,
the recent WHO review of the preclinical antibiotic pipeline
suggests that around 40% of these candidate therapies under
development are pathogen-specific.74 Although this trend is
promising and must be encouraged to lessen the impact of
cross-resistance caused by the use of broad spectrum drugs,75
the clinical use of such drugs will be hindered by the lack of
accompanying diagnostics that can clearly and quickly identify
the infectious agent, including in low-income settings.76 This
actually increases the commercial risks involved in the
development of pathogen-specific therapies; these early stage
projects may therefore require additional incentives. However,
the lack of clinically available diagnostics is not just a problem
for future therapies−for example, it is estimated that over 30%
of antibiotic prescriptions in outpatient settings in the United
States may be unnecessary,77 further driving the spread of drug
resistance. This is intimately connected to the lack of clinically
available diagnostics that can rapidly identify the disease
causing pathogen and its corresponding antibiotic suscepti-
bility profile.78 Importantly, such diagnostics need to clearly
identify the disease causing pathogen, which is often
technically challenging: infections may occur in locations that
are difficult to access and sample or may involve multiple
pathogens that may confound the diagnosis. That said, much
can be done to improve upon best practice and compliance in
the use of blood culture systems to identify pathogens for
minimum inhibitory concentration testing, both within
developed and developing health care settings.79,80 Further,
the most common conditions where antibiotics are inappropri-
ately used involve upper respiratory tract infections81 that are
relatively easy to sample, and clinically available rapid
diagnostics may play an important role in reducing
unnecessary prescribing in these indications.
A number of rapid diagnostic technologies already exist, but
clinical uptake and commercialization remains the challenge.78
An encouraging development in this regard is the recent
investment by the European Union’s Innovative Medicines
Initiative in the establishment of VALUE-Dx, a multi-
disciplinary consortium involving both industrial and non-
industrial partners, to develop and foster the clinical translation
of rapid diagnostics to guide antibiotic stewardship (https://
value-dx.eu/index.php/what-is-value-dx/). As with the rest of
this field, the investment must be made now: debates about
cost-effectiveness of widespread diagnostic testing at present,
especially in publicly funded health systems, must bear in mind
the need for supporting this diagnostic development ecosystem
for the future, when it may urgently be required. Studies on the
intergenerational ethics of AMR have stressed the importance
of managing the problem bearing in mind that this is a slowly
emerging disaster, which extends beyond the term of office of
individual governments and requires visionary policies to build
resilience and preparation for a world where few effective
antimicrobials are available.82 We note that in the event of a
fast spreading, drug resistant bacterial or fungal pathogen
epidemic, rapid testing will be a priority; this is best
exemplified by the critical need for rapid tests for the SARS-
CoV-2 virus in the current pandemic and the difficulties that
most countries have faced due to the lack of resilience and
capacity in testing infrastructure.
■ INCENTIVES SHOULD BE LINKED TO “ONE
HEALTH” CONSIDERATIONS TO ENSURE THE
SUSTAINABILITY OF NEW ANTIMICROBIALS
Another important aspect is the broader consideration of “One
Health”83 in tackling AMR. A major point of delinking the
value of new antimicrobials from the volume of sales is to
protect the new therapeutic from overuse, inappropriate use,
and accompanying resistance. However, poor manufacturing
protocols can lead to environmental contamination with the
active pharmaceutical ingredient, which leads to environmental
reservoirs of resistance. Although at first glance one might only
consider this to be a problem with generics manufacturers as
we detail below, the lack of transparency in reporting
environmental contamination with antibiotics is a problem
with manufacturers across the globe. As reported by the ReAct
group in 2018, only GlaxoSmithKline, Johnson & Johnson,
Pfizer, and Roche had applied limits to antibiotics in effluent at
supplier sites, and no companies had committed to publishing
environmental audit results or antibiotic discharge levels.84
Recognizing the importance of the issue, steps have been
taken at a global level to develop appropriate guidelines for
producers of antibiotics. The WHO proposed various policies
to guide both manufacturers and procurers of antibiotics in
2019.85 The AMR Industry Alliance has published “predicted
no-effect concentrations” that may be used to establish
antibiotic waste discharge targets at manufacturing sites.86
The Alliance has also established a manufacturing framework
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to guide responsible antibiotic production practices.86
However, much remains to be done to ensure the
implementation of these policies globally. For example, in
India, a major producer of antibiotics, recent reports suggest
that the concentration of ciprofloxacin in treated wastewater
from a pharmaceutical factory in the city of Hyderabad was
equivalent to that required to treat 44000 people.87 Taking
cognizance of the issue, the Indian government has proposed a
law to tackle pharmaceutical pollution linked to antibiotic
production, with standards even more stringent than those
suggested by the AMR Industry Alliance.88 This is welcome
news and represents the first attempt by a state regulator
anywhere in the world to introduce such standards.88
However, the country’s pharmaceutical industry is already
attempting to weaken the provisions of the law,89 and it
remains to be seen how effectively any new limits on antibiotic
waste will be enforced.
Similarly, inappropriate use of antibiotics in livestock
farming has led to widespread bacterial resistance against
critical antibiotics. As economies in many LMICs develop,
demand for animal protein has rapidly increased.90 As a result,
livestock farming is intensifying, leading to an increase in
antibiotic use in feed and for therapeutic purposes. In Vietnam,
for instance, critical antibiotics for humans including colistin,
neomycin, and gentamicin were regularly used in pigs and
chickens, leading to Escherichia coli strains developing
resistance toward these antibiotics.91 If antibiotic use in
farmed animals is not effectively regulated and restricted,
developing new antibiotics for therapeutic use is unlikely to
bring long-lasting benefits to human and veterinary health care.
■ GLOBAL COORDINATION IS KEY TO TACKLING
THE DIVERSE CHALLENGES OF AMR
Our analysis shows that AMR is a multifaceted problem that
affects populations across the globe. Further, AMR is an
evolutionarily driven process, and not a problem that can
simply be “solved” once and for all. Thinking beyond the
problems of antimicrobial resistance, perhaps as troubling is the
fact that 5.7 million people currently die annually of treatable
infections, due to a lack of access (Figure 2) to effective
antimicrobials.92 Therefore, governments and other public or
charitable funders in particular will require strict eligibility
criteria to select the beneficiaries of any proposed commercial
incentives to ensure that public health, and specifically patient
needs, are addressed at a global level.62 Robust health
economic analysis and clinical considerations such as
addressing unmet needs and focusing on drugs that are
resilient to the development of resistance (Box 2), should be
used to ensure that we incentivize the most beneficial
antimicrobials; tying this tightly to regulatory conditions and
access requirements will ensure that tax payers and patients
receive value for their investments. It is important to note that
these considerations may be viewed as further disincentives to
antimicrobial R&D by the pharmaceutical industry, since they
may pose additional liabilities on the developers. It is therefore
crucial to address these issues at the earliest stages of
negotiations between governments and charities (who will
most likely pay for the incentives) and developers. These
additional, and very important, costs must be factored in to the
incentive packages to ensure that antimicrobial R&D is suitably
incentivized while still providing the best value for the public
investments proposed.
It is clear that these challenges would benefit from collective
multinational action. At the CeBIL Annual Symposium in
September 2019 in Cambridge (UK), on “legal innovations to
support the development of anti-microbial drugs”, a discussion
arose outlining the need for the AMR equivalent of the Paris
Climate Accord. This idea is increasingly gaining traction, and
the intervening months have seen detailed proposals put forth
in a recent paper by Steven Hoffman and colleagues.93 The
paper describes how certain unique features of the Paris
Agreement could be reused in the development of a global
AMR treaty, including the use of individualized national action
plans on a country-by-country basis and the development of
clear overarching goals that the treaty should target.93
We believe such a treaty would facilitate the coordination of
a global incentive plan, not only to develop, manufacture, and
distribute new antimicrobials where they are most needed but
importantly also to ensure the strictest adherence to suitable
manufacturing waste discharge targets and the responsible use
of the new drugs. This may also involve the establishment of a
global repository for novel antimicrobials, with access provided
to countries that abide by the treaty. Indeed, our analysis based
on a literature review leads to three clear global goals that the
treaty may address, which would devolve responsibility93
pragmatically across HICs and LMICs, as resources and
capabilities enable (Figure 3):
(a) Commit to solving the antimicrobial market failure
problem and incentivizing the development of one new
antimicrobial every year that specifically addresses an
unmet clinical need. HICs form the markets of greatest
interest to pharmaceutical companies and are best
placed to deliver this target, where possible in partner-
ship with LMICs.
(b) Commit to leading the development of stringent,
scientifically approved stewardship guidelines, particu-
larly around waste discharge targets in antibiotic
production and stewardship in clinical, veterinary, and
agricultural use. As balancing access versus stewardship
is a greater challenge in LMICs than HICs, context-
Figure 2. Estimates of global deaths due to AMR, including future
predictions, and deaths due to treatable infections caused by lack of
access to effective antimicrobials. Data based on the O’Neill (AMR
related) and CDDEP reports.3,92 Current COVID-19 related deaths
are provided for context, approximately a year into the crisis; data
retrieved from Worldometer on 15th December 2020.
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specific laws and policies in this area may be better
suited for development in LMICs, before being applied
globally.
(c) Continuous dialogue and reflective learning between
HICs and LMICs should be established to tailor policies
that incentivize antimicrobial discovery and stewardship,
to address not only growing resistance and the shrinking
reserve of effective antimicrobials but also limited access
to effective and affordable therapies particularly in low-
income settings in LMICs.
In relation to point a above, given the magnitude of costs
needed to incentivize antimicrobial development, it is
imperative that governments in HICs bring together finance
and health ministries to help lever the resources required. The
proposed treaty may provide an umbrella under which these
efforts could be pooled. One potential mechanism that might
be suited to the task is the antibiotic Health Impact Fund.94
This would be funded by national governments (potentially
also including major charitable organizations such as the Gates
Foundation) and provide resources to drug developers who
would in return register their product and receive regular
reward payments proportional to (and conditional on) the
clinical value of the product. The developer would agree to
certain conditions involving the sale and distribution of the
product, specifically addressing access related concerns across
both HICs and LMICs. The fund would serve as a global
coordination mechanism for developing new antibiotics and
crucially would incentivize the appropriate timing of market
entry for these drugs, thus addressing various resistance and
stewardship related challenges that are inherent to the sale and
use of new antibiotics.94
Further, with respect to point b, efforts to foster stewardship
in LMICs are already in place. The Global Antibiotic
Resistance Partnership (GARP), “ReAct”, and the “Alliance
for the Prudent Use of Antibiotics” are examples of such
efforts, focusing on understanding the spread of antibiotic
resistance and effective policy responses to AMR. Successful
stewardship will require going beyond AMR surveillance and
addressing the constraints in health systems in LMICs.95 This
includes expanding diagnostic capacity in clinical and
community settings, continued education on AMR for both
health care workers and the general public, increased
regulatory capacity at the national and international levels to
enforce regulations, and improving dialogue and collaboration
between the public sector, private sector, and civil societies.95
We argue that working toward global antimicrobial steward-
ship requires responsible antibiotic use, as defined in Dyar et
al.,96 needs to be linked to One Health, and needs to be
extended to public policies that aim at incentivizing drug
discovery.
These three recommendations will help HICs benefit from
appropriate global stewardship and the corresponding
reduction in drug resistant species, whereas LMICs would
benefit from the new drugs bankrolled by HICs at affordable
Box 2. Proposed Policy Solutions
• A range of “pull” incentives are required in addition to
the current “push” incentives to solve the antimicrobial
market failure problem and stimulate antimicrobial
R&D pipelines.
• Additional push incentives are required to support early
translational work, including structurally informed
medicinal chemistry to develop clear antibacterial
activity.
• Governments and payers must be allowed flexibility in
the formulation of incentive packages; individual
companies will likely require bespoke solutions,
depending on their size, the number of drugs in their
pipeline, and the number of drugs brought to market.
• Any commercial incentives must be tied to stewardship,
the use of manufacturing standards to limit environ-
mental contamination, and equitable access across both
HICs and LMICs, depending on the clinical need.
• The incentive package should also be dependent on the
quality of the new drug, with larger incentives for the
development of drugs where resistance will take longer
to develop. However, the speed of the development of
resistance to a new drug is unpredictable, which
suggests that some of the rewards for drug development
along these lines may need to be held back until after
the drug is on the market. The rewards would also need
to be awarded in a phased manner. The recently
proposed Antibiotic Susceptibility Bonus, which details
conditional payments post-market-entry as part of MER
incentives, offers a potential mechanism to address this
problem.106
• Establish a global supranational treaty modeled on the
Paris Climate Agreement to coordinate policy inter-
ventions and incentives across the globe, while ensuring
equitable access to drugs depending on clinical need.
• Establish frameworks to facilitate open collaboration in
basic research and clinical trials for antimicrobial
development.
• Increase support to early career academics and doctoral
training in the antimicrobial drug discovery field,
particularly those developing innovative, novel ap-
proaches, to ensure that the antimicrobial development
ecosystem is sustainable and to prevent the sudden
collapse of the skills and talent pool in the field.
Figure 3. Global coordination is needed to solve the market failure
crisis in antimicrobials and to balance access versus stewardship
requirements across the globe. Continuous dialogue and reflective
learning across nations will be critical for combatting the myriad
policy challenges of AMR at a global level.
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prices as long as strict stewardship criteria are enforced for
their use. A dialogue between HICs and LMICs will ensure
that drug discovery policies in HICs reflect the challenges of
affordable access to effective antimicrobials in LMICs by, for
instance, prioritizing therapeutics that can benefit a large
proportion of populations that currently lack access.
Beyond an international treaty, which may take some years
to organize, another means of facilitating global cooperation on
AMR would be through the incorporation of AMR specific
indicators in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as
has recently been proposed by the ReAct group.97 Beyond
tracking resistance and access related issues, discussing the
need to reinvigorate the antimicrobial pipeline in a sustainable
manner is, we argue, a worthy addition. Besides influencing
and guiding high-level policy making, such supranational
treaties and goals can be leveraged for attracting widespread
public engagement with the problem and should include the
further development of initiatives such as the World Antibiotic
Awareness Week.98 A general public recognition of the value of
antimicrobials, which may evolve in response to such
supranational treaties, will be crucial for influencing political
decisions regarding pharmaceutical incentives and antimicro-
bial stewardship in individual countries.
■ CONCLUSION
In March 2020, while the global health community was
focused on COVID-19, the discovery of yet another novel
antibiotic resistance gene (garosamine-specific aminoglycoside
resistance, gar) was reported.99 The gene provides high-level
resistance against aminoglycosides; worryingly, it is suspected
of having activity against plazomicin, the new antibiotic
developed by Achaogen to circumvent the most common
aminoglycoside resistance mechanisms.99 Although discovered
in environmental samples from India, the gene was
subsequently identified in environmental samples from Europe,
Asia, Africa, and Australia and in a small number of clinical and
food borne pathogen isolates in Europe, Asia, and North
America, showing that the resistance gene had already spread
globally across multiple pathogenic species, even before
identification.99
This reiterates the fact that AMR is a global burden, which
needs global solutions that can address the health, economic,
scientific, political, and regulatory aspects of the problem. The
current global ecosystem for incentivizing antimicrobial
development has focused mostly on push incentives to fund
drug development. We argue that this is insufficient in the face
of the market failure problems: at a global level, a policy shift is
required to reward antimicrobial drug development and
production while still strictly regulating the usage of newly
developed therapeutics. As we have outlined, a number of
strategies already exist for this purpose, and governments need
flexibility to develop bespoke incentive packages for different
developers, which may be very different depending on the size
of the company involved and its portfolio. This must also
include incentives for the development of diagnostic tests to
accompany new drugs that target specific pathogens; in
particular, the use of these tests in clinical settings must be
incentivized to maintain the test development ecosystem. This
will involve discussions between test developers, patients,
clinicians, hospital administrators, and health ministries to
ensure clinical uptake and regular feedback to improve test
performance and will ultimately have to include testing in low
resource settings as well.
We have stressed the importance of global cooperation in
tackling this challenge, using the template of global
cooperation on climate change as a starting point. However,
we acknowledge that these are challenging times for global
treaties. In an era where the rise of nationalist politics is
severely undermining international cooperation, it remains to
be seen whether, in the long term, the response to the COVID-
19 crisis leads to a hardening of international barriers or an
increase in cooperation for mutual benefit. However, what is
clear is that problems like AMR and pandemics require a
globally coordinated response, with nation states accountable
to each other as well as to their own citizens for ensuring the
health of humanity as a whole. The appetite for global
collaboration to help tackle COVID-19 may have opened an
opportunity to explore the establishment of early stage “open
source” not-for-profit discovery activities. These could
potentially feed into development programs, with value built
in the data package obtained for submission to regulatory
authorities, rather than traditional IP based programs; such
approaches have recently been espoused by M4K pharma
(https://m4kpharma.com/) and Matthew Todd,100 for exam-
ple.
We were forewarned about the dangers of pandemics from
SARS-like coronaviruses,101 but with viruses the exact nature
and timing of outbreaks is difficult to predict. Policies are
already being proposed to minimize the likelihood of COVID-
like pandemics in the future; estimates suggest that the cost of
such measures (gross) will be around $22−31 billion per
year.102 With drug resistant microbial infections, the dangers
and cost-benefits are more predictable. To cite just one
example, the MER based market incentive of $1 billion per
antibiotic proposed in the DRIVE-AB report34 is miniscule in
comparison to the potential costs of AMR.4 With COVID-19,
we are also witnessing the rapid development of comple-
mentary push and pull incentives to develop, manufacture, and
distribute vaccines across the globe with unprecedented
speed.103 The progress on the COVID-19 vaccine has
underscored the advantages of global cooperation, with
research scientists, funders, and vaccine manufacturers joining
forces across both HICs and LMICs to overcome the twin
challenges of R&D and access.104
It is therefore striking that, in the case of antibiotics, market
failure is still hindering the development of one of the most
significant life-saving measures ever developed by medical
science. Solving this must be a top priority for governments.
This is an insurance policy that we desperately need.
Multisectorial initiatives like the recently launched AMR
Action Fund (https://amractionfund.com/) must be sup-
ported, expanded, and sustained to maintain a viable
antimicrobial development ecosystem. In another promising
development, major charities such as the Wellcome Trust are
increasingly recognizing the challenges of AMR105 and are
restructuring their funding priorities to focus further on
infectious diseases.
In this Perspective, we have focused primarily on how
governments and public organizations can incentivize and
support antimicrobial R&D, while ensuring the best outcomes
for the public across the globe. The incentives proposed must
be sufficient in scale and scope to encourage pharmaceutical
companies and their private investors back into the field, while
importantly still meeting the access requirements and “One
Health” considerations that we propose must be tied to any
public investments in the field. A frank and open dialogue
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between public funders, private investors, health policy makers,
patient groups, and pharmaceutical industry leaders will be
required to ensure that any incentives (monetary or
regulatory) enacted make antimicrobials a viable investment
for private companies while meeting public health goals
globally. Perhaps a new global awareness of infectious diseases
will enable a more effective engagement with civil society and
these various public and private institutions, the emergence of
a healthy charity sector, and the voices required to help drive
change. For many whose lives rely on antimicrobial drugs, the
time to act is now.
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